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Summary [max 150 words] 
 
It has long been assumed that energy use is necessary for economic growth, and that 
economic growth is the prerequisite for human development. Without radical technological 
improvement, energy use leads to carbon emissions. In this article, we connect new findings 
to clarify the links between carbon and human development. We analyse the change in trends 
and correlations between human development indicators and carbon, adjusting carbon 
emissions for internationally traded goods and services, and examine the diversity in national 
development trajectories. Adjusting for the transfer of emissions through trade explains many 
outliers, with socioeconomic benefits accruing to carbon-importing rather than carbon-
exporting countries. Currently, high life expectancy is compatible with low carbon emissions, 
but high incomes are not. Despite strong international trends, there is no deterministic 
industrial development trajectory. 
 
Introduction 
Seriously addressing climate change in an equitable manner requires drastically cutting 
carbon emissions.  To “avoid dangerous climate change,” as was agreed by 194 countries in 
the 1992 UN Framework Convention, would require rapid reductions in emissions, from 1.2 
tC/capita on average in 2005 1 to well below 1 tC/capita by 2050, with proposals ranging 
from 0.6 to 0.2 tC/capita 2,3.  What quality of life is possible on such dramatically lower 
levels of carbon emissions? 
There has long been a focus on the close correlation between overall economic activity, 
energy use and resulting carbon emissions, as well as between economic activity and human 
development indicators, such as life expectancy. The assumption of a double carbon-
economy and economy-human development linkage is at the core of international 
disagreements over addressing climate change.  Rapidly-developing countries such as Brazil, 
India and China have resisted binding limits on their emissions during the first commitment 
periods of the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that they would be condemned to perpetual 
underdevelopment. Among some wealthier countries, such as the US, there is resistance to 
ratify any protocol that would limit US emissions and “result in serious harm to the 
economy” 4. If this commonly-held double assumption holds true, then strong economic 
growth is necessary to improve human development, and consequently greenhouse gas 
emissions can only be reduced through radical technological improvements not yet readily 
and affordably available.  
The links between resource use, especially abundant technical energy from fossil fuels, and 
economic and human progress have long been studied 5-9, most often assuming constant or 
only slowly shifting relationships between them (for instance through the increasing energy 
efficiency of modern economies). International studies have demonstrated, however, that 
economic activity and life expectancy are not perfectly, or permanently, correlated, with high 
life expectancies attainable at ever declining levels of income 10. The latest UNDP Human 
Development Report questions the development-growth correlation 11. In recent work 12, we 
observed that human development has been steadily decoupling from energy and carbon 
emissions over the past thirty years. Although most countries whose economies are growing 
also experienced significant growth in carbon emissions, a number of countries have 
developed socioeconomically without requiring large increases in carbon emissions. To look 
at global averages and correlations misses the important differences not just of outlier 
nations, but the fact that there are qualitatively different development pathways nations have 
taken.  Focusing on the relationship between emissions and human development in the past 
decades provides potential insights into future development pathways combining 
environmental sustainability and human well-being. 
In this article, we first characterize the extent to which high life expectancy and income 
require high carbon emissions.  We improve on past analyses by testing the impact of 
adjusting these correlations for the carbon embodied in internationally traded goods and 
services. Next, we analyze the implications of simultaneously considering life expectancy, 
income and carbon emissions. Finally, we follow the development pathways of these three 
variables for several key nations from 1990 to 2005, the period where the data sets overlap.   
Carbon transfers through international trade 
More recently, the relative decarbonisation of wealthy nations’ economies has been 
questioned, because these countries could be benefiting not only from the carbon emitted 
within their national territory (which are the emissions recorded in national and international 
statistics), but also from the carbon emissions embodied in the goods and services they import 
13-18.  This is important both analytically and practically: mitigation commitments are easily 
fulfilled if higher-emitting facilities are simply displaced to developing countries outside 
those that have binding commitments (specifically, the 43 countries in Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol).   
Several pioneering studies based on Environmentally-Extended Input-Output methodologies 
have recently provided the first robust estimates of international trade-corrected 
consumption-based carbon 15,17 and other greenhouse gas emissions 16. Conventional carbon 
accounting covers emissions occurring in the country’s territory. These are the basis of the 
Kyoto Protocol agreements. Consumption-based accounting corrects territorial emissions by 
adding emissions generated to produce imported goods and services, and subtracting those 
generated to produce exports.  This method has now been extended to estimate consumption-
based emissions for a large set of countries in the time span 1990-2008 18. 
Human development and carbon emissions 
Conventional analysis, such as the Kaya identity 19, conceptualizes socioeconomic parameters 
as drivers of carbon emissions; in contrast, in this work, we are pursuing the reverse analysis, 
investigating human development as an outcome of the physical processes which result in 
carbon emissions. According to our hypothesis, consumption-based emissions, which include 
the carbon embodied in all goods and services consumed in a country, should reflect the 
socioeconomic benefits accruing from these emission processes far better than conventional 
territorial emissions.  This can be seen in terms of carbon emissions per unit GDP, which tend 
to converge in a consumption perspective 20. In the most extreme example, a country which 
burns fossil fuels purely for exported products would not have any left over for its 
population’s benefit; thus, territorial emissions would reflect the population’s consumption 
and human development very poorly. 
To examine the dependency of socioeconomic progress on carbon-fuelled processes, we 
characterize the relationship between human development and carbon emissions. Life 
expectancy and income are chosen as two main (but by no means exclusive) indicators of 
human development, and both territorial and consumption-based carbon emissions are 
considered, in order to explore the role of international trade in these relationships.  
The countries and regions in Fig 1 are displayed as horizontal arrows, moving from territorial 
to consumption-based carbon emissions. The start of the arrow thus corresponds to 
conventional national accounting (such as was used in the Kyoto Protocol), whereas the head 
of the arrow takes into account the emissions embodied in trade. Carbon-exporting countries 
move from right to left (gray arrows, solid lines), and carbon-importing countries move from 
left to right (red arrows, dashed lines). Countries whose emissions are mostly unaffected by 
trade are shown as blue circles. The area of the points is proportional to population.  
 
<Figure 1 close to here> 
 
As expected, both territorial and consumption-based carbon emissions are highly correlated 
to the human development indicators in Fig. 1. However, the relationship between carbon and 
income is very different from the correlation between carbon and life expectancy. Carbon 
emissions scale roughly proportionally with income, with a high goodness-of-fit, whereas life 
expectancy grows with carbon emissions in the lower range, but then appears to decouple, 
reaching a level where higher emissions do not generate much benefit, and has a lower 
goodness-of-fit.  
These different behaviors can be seen in Fig 1: life expectancy has a sharp turning point 
absent for income (the income-carbon plot is linear in log-log space). The correction from 
territorial to consumption-based emissions draws the countries closer to the curves. The 
impact of adjusting for the embodied carbon in imports and exports through the consumption-
based emissions is significant, improving the goodness-of-fit R2. Consumption-based 
indicators of national emissions explain 91% of the variation in national GDP per capita and 
72% of life expectancy rates, 9% and 7% more than conventional territorial emissions, 
respectively.  
The countries and regions above and to the left of the regression curves in Fig. 1 are doing 
better than the global average in terms of the life expectancy and income they achieve at their 
level of carbon emissions.  The countries below and to the right are doing worse. The patterns 
in Fig. 1 explain large categories of outliers: countries far from the global trends. The curves 
strikingly separate the carbon importers from the exporters: even when the carbon embodied 
in their exports is subtracted, most carbon exporting countries remain below and to the right 
of the curve. In contrast, the vast majority of the carbon importers are above and to the left of 
the curve: they disproportionately benefit in income and length of life from the global 
division of labor, even with the addition of carbon embodied in their imports.  
Simultaneous analysis and trade-offs 
Consumption-based emissions are consequently the most appropriate for comparison with 
human development. The three-dimensional plot (Fig. 2) enables the simultaneous 
visualization of life expectancy (vertical axis), consumption-based emissions (horizontal axis) 
and income (color scale), and thus summarizes the important trends and variation of the 
global system in the year 2004. A life expectancy between 75 and 80 years of age was 
achieved by countries with carbon emissions ranging from a modest 0.5 tC/capita for Costa 
Rica to the largest, 6.2 tC/capita, for the United States, a more than twelve-fold difference. 
The income range for these countries was also extreme, from 4’500 (Albania) to 36,000 
USD/capita (United States again). If we zoom in on the countries with lifespan of over 70 
years (or “three score and ten,” Psalm 90:10) and less than one ton of carbon emitted per 
person in 2004, we see a large range in possible incomes, from 2’500 to 12’000 USD/capita. 
This we have dubbed the “Goldemberg Corner;”  after former Environment Minister of 
Brazil Jose Goldemberg, who argued we could achieve “basic needs and much more” for 1 
ton of carbon per capita or less 12. The countries in this area are mostly Latin American, but 
there are also a few Asian, Eastern European, and North African nations. 
 
<Figure 2 close to here> 
 
The large range in carbon emissions and incomes at the highest life expectancies could be 
seen as good news. However, there is a clear pattern within these ranges: the countries at the 
lowest carbon ranges of their life expectancy cohort are also the ones at the lowest incomes. 
This confirms the pattern seen in Fig. 1: high life expectancies and low carbon emissions are 
compatible with each other, but this combination is incompatible with higher incomes, given 
the evidence provided by existing societies. 
 Trajectories of individual countries 
The final objective of this article is to move beyond global trends to find examples of 
countries with more sustainable pathways of economic and social development, and to assess 
whether their relative sustainability holds up even when their emissions from the import of 
goods and services are taken into account.   
We address this question by observing the development trajectories of 13 key countries and 
regions from 1990 to 2005, in terms of our three variables: life expectancy, income, and per 
capita carbon emissions (both territorial and consumption-based), and comparing these 
trajectories to the global trend lines. The countries in Fig. 3 were selected for regional 
representation, size and interest, and they represent over half of the world’s population and 
carbon emissions. Although the typical trajectory is one of growth in all three dimensions of 
carbon, income, and life expectancy, the Russian Federation and many African countries 
suffered decreases in life expectancy over the period, due to political and economic collapse 
and the AIDS epidemic respectively. As a consequence, the trajectories in Fig 3 are upwards, 
except when indicated otherwise with arrows. The UK experienced a significant decrease in 
its territorial emissions per capita, although emissions grew when embodied emissions in 
trade were considered 21-23. For some countries, the trajectories show the consequences of 
political upheaval (Russian Federation) and economic crises (Chile, Japan). 
 
<Figure 3 close to here> 
 
The countries with the highest life expectancy in Fig. 3(a) tend to be net importers of carbon 
through trade, or neutral overall when imports and exports are considered, like Chile. As seen 
in Fig. 2, the highest life expectancies are attainable at vastly varying carbon emission levels: 
from Costa Rica and Chile below 1tC/capita to the US closer to 6 tC/capita. In contrast, the 
richest countries in Fig. 3(b), Japan, the UK and the US, with incomes above 20’000 
USD/capita, all have carbon emissions well above 2tC/capita. The richest countries in Fig. 
3(b) are also net importers of carbon through trade of goods and services, whereas the 
intermediate income countries are a mixture: Costa Rica is a net importer, but South Africa, 
the Russian Federation and China are net exporters of embodied carbon, and Chile, Brazil 
and Iran are closer to neutral overall. Among the poorest, India and Nigeria are net exporters, 
but Bangladesh is an importer. As we know from Fig. 1, most of the poorest countries are in 
fact net carbon importers. 
Overall, the development trajectories in Fig. 3 are consistent with the trends seen in Figs. 1 
and 2 but provide important details suggesting a richer story.  Overall, high life expectancy is 
attainable at a large range of carbon emissions, whereas income is much more linked with 
carbon. However, and perhaps surprisingly, several countries do not follow the global trends 
(shown for 1990 and 2005, consumption-based emissions): in general, the growth in 
socioeconomic benefits is larger than the growth in carbon emissions could account for, if the 
trend curves were followed. This explains why the global trend curves are steadily moving 
upwards, as we have previously shown 12. This is evidence of relative, but not absolute, 
decoupling of socioeconomic gains from carbon-intensive processes. Moreover, the diversity 
of development pathways shown in Fig. 3 is evidence that there is no deterministic single 
development trajectory, despite the fact that all the countries shown are linked by global trade 
and rely to a large extent on similar technologies. 
General discussion 
Several major implications can be drawn from these results.  Most importantly, a 
consumption view of carbon emissions based on emissions embodied in trade reflects the 
socioeconomic benefits more closely than the territorial accounting used in previous studies 
(Fig. 1). Second, carbon emissions are much more strongly linked to income than to life 
expectancy; and the monetary wealth achieved by most OECD countries corresponds to 
consumption-based carbon emissions significantly above the territorial emissions taken into 
account by the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Most of the carbon-exporting countries and regions are grouped at intermediate life 
expectancy (between 63 and 75 years) and income (between 2’000 and 12’0000  
USD/capita). They perform worse than the global trend in terms of socioeconomic 
achievement given their level of carbon emissions. Even when their emissions are corrected 
for the embodied carbon in international trade, most of them are still below the global trend. 
This surprising result indicates that there is a systematic disadvantage, in terms of 
socioeconomic benefits, for carbon exporting economies. Besides China and India, which are 
relatively close to the global trend, these countries are mainly from the former Soviet Union, 
Eastern Europe, Middle East, and South Africa. They are the fossil-exporting and raw 
material-exporting economies. This suggests the double negative of specializing in natural 
resource extraction and earlier stages of processing and manufacturing 24,25, and can be 
interpreted as evidence for the environmentally-unequal exchange theory first described by 
Bunker 26.  
 
The carbon importing countries, in contrast, are an extremely diverse group. They are 
comprised of high socioeconomic status OECD countries (life expectancies above 75 years 
and national average income above 12’000 USD/capita), some intermediate countries from 
Asia and Latin America, and most of the countries with low socioeconomic status (life 
expectancies below 63 years, income below 2’000 USD/capita), which are overwhelmingly 
African. The membership of the carbon-importing club is thus comprised of two extremes: 
the most socio-economically well-off, and the poorest of the poor. The plight of development 
is particularly acute for these poor countries, which are constrained to import not just energy 
itself, but also carbon-intensive goods and services from the global market, sometimes 
relying on large amounts of foreign assistance for this purpose 27. These countries are thus 
doubly vulnerable to price increases in fossil fuels. 
 
Interestingly, the consumption-based regression curves lie above the territorial ones at higher 
emissions, and below at lower emissions (although this difference is not visible in Fig. 1), and 
this difference is particularly significant for income. This indicates that lower income levels 
require higher carbon emissions than previously thought, when trade is taken into 
consideration. At higher incomes, this effect merely corrects for the apparent “Environmental 
Kuznets Curve,” due to the larger territorial emissions of middle-income carbon exporting 
economies, and lower territorial emissions of high income countries. This supports the 
finding that the Environmental Kuznets Curve for carbon per capita does not exist after 
correcting for embedded carbon emissions of imports 15,28-31, see also 32. 
 
The observation of country trajectories demonstrates that these are not determined by the 
global trend curves, and that there exists a wide variety of possible development possibilities 
(Fig. 3). However, the high income/high carbon link is still clearly visible. The trajectory 
analysis demonstrates that it is possible for a country to attain high life expectancy at carbon 
emissions below 1 tC/capita – but not if their incomes are beyond 12’000 USD/capita (Fig. 
2). 
 Implications of findings and future research 
Ideally, nations could achieve all three of the objectives required for sustainable 
development: low carbon emissions, high life expectancy, and high income.  However, the 
evidence from our analysis demonstrates that it is indeed possible to achieve simultaneous 
environmental and social sustainability (in the form of lower carbon emissions and high life 
expectancy), but only at levels of income below 12’000 USD/capita (Fig. 2). Indeed, the 
coupling between economic activity and carbon emissions (Fig 1b) is stronger than the 
correlation between life expectancy and carbon emissions (Fig 1a), or between life 
expectancy and income. This enables certain combinations of desirable outcomes, but not all: 
high life expectancies and income are compatible, so are high life expectancies and low 
carbon emissions, but economic and environmental goals appear to be at odds with each 
other, at least at the highest levels of GDP per capita.  
In other words, a moderate income is currently a necessary (but not sufficient) requirement 
for environmental sustainability: “necessary” because no high income country has carbon 
emissions below 1tC/capita; “not sufficient” because moderate incomes do not guarantee 
either high life expectancy or low carbon emissions. This finding has clear implications for 
developing scenarios of sustainable futures, with higher priority accorded to low emissions 
and high social well-being, and less emphasis placed on the size of the economic output. 
This study suggests crucial avenues for further research. The causal factors underlying 
development pathways may be explored, in order to explore viable low carbon transitions 
going forward. These causal factors certainly comprise resource endowment, industrial 
structure, colonial links, and a country’s role in the global division of labor (e.g. trade based 
on extraction, manufacture, finance, tourism, aid-dependence, or debt-fueled consumption).  
This work could tie emissions to economic geography and political economy within 
economics, sociology, and history.  A better understanding of the obvious regional 
differences in the national trajectories seen in Fig 3 is of clear interest: What has been the role 
of national and provincial government decisions in development planning? Were nations cast 
into path dependency, or were national and local planners and politicians effective in re-
directing national “green (or not-green) pathways”?  Reflection is necessary on alternatives to 
policies and governments which prioritize economic growth at the expense of climate 
stability and human equity.   
 
There is much further work to do on scenarios, projecting current trends of nations and 
groups of nations that are moving in a measurable direction. What will the structure of global 
pathways look like if these countries continue in the directions they are heading? Can this 
approach better inform socioeconomic elements of global climate models? The implications 
of these findings are substantial, then, both for climate modelers and for development 
planners. For planners and decision-makers, the findings provide hope that national choices 
and pathways matter, and that alternatives are available to policies that prioritize economic 
growth at the expense of climate stability and a long life for our citizens. 
Methods summary 
The data used in this article came from the following sources: life expectancy and population 
from the United Nations Population Division 33; GDP in Purchasing Power Parity constant 
2000 USD from the World Bank 34; territorial carbon emissions from the Carbon Dioxide 
Information and Analysis Center 1; consumption-based carbon emissions from Peters et al 
2011 18. These data sources were combined to match the GTAP country/regions used in 18 by 
estimating regional values, utilizing the full 2004 MRIO for the data shown in Figs. 1 & 2 
and the TSTRD approximation for the trajectories in Fig. 3. 
 
The regressions in Figs 1 & 3 are based on population weighted linear least squares fitting. 
The regression form for income vs. carbon is logarithmic, the function for life expectancy is 
hyperbolic and described in Steinberger and Roberts 2010 12. The implications of population 
weighting are also discussed in 12. The fit results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Regression results for the trend curves shown in Figs. 1 and 3.  
 Number of 
countries/regions 
and fraction of 
global population 
Year Emissions 
accounting 
R2 Ordinate 
at origin 
Slope 
 
Saturation 
value 
Figure 1(a): 
Life 
expectancy 
109,  99.1% 
 
2004 Territorial 0.65 2.92 
(0.02)
-0.23 
(0.02) 
90.03
Consumption-
based: MRIO
0.72 2.89 
(0.02)
-0.26 
(0.02) 
90.03
Figure 1(b): 
Income 
106, 97.9% 2004 Territorial 0.82 8.85 
(0.05)
0.68 
(0.03) 
 
Consumption-
based: MRIO
0.91 8.91 
(0.03)
0.77 
(0.02) 
 
Figure 3(a): 
Life 
expectancy 
108,  98.9% 1990 Consumption-
based: TSTRD
0.78 2.85 
(0.02)
-0.24 
(0.01) 
86.8
109,  99.1% 2005 0.71 2.91 
(0.02)
-0.27 
(0.02) 
90.5
Figure 3(b): 
Income 
104,  97.5% 1990 Consumption-
based: TSTRD
 
0.81 8.59 
(0.06)
0.70 
(0.04) 
 
105,  97.9% 2005 0.90 8.92 
(0.03)
0.77 
(0.03) 
 
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.
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Figure legends 
 
Fig. 1: Human development and carbon emissions. Each arrow shows the movement of a 
country/region from territorial to consumption-based carbon emissions for one 
country/region, with respect to (a) life expectancy and (b) income, in 2004. The arrowhead 
size represents national population. Carbon importers are red; exporters, gray; net neutral 
countries are blue circles. The arrows move towards the regression curves, leading to better 
goodness-of-fit for consumption-based emissions: consumption-based accounting is thus a 
substantially better predictor of human development.   
 
Fig 2: Life expectancy, income and carbon in 3D. Three-dimensional representation of life 
expectancy (vertical axis), consumption-based emissions (horizontal axis) and income (color 
scale) in 2004.  The expanded area includes the “Goldemberg Corner,” with life expectancy 
over 70 and less than 1 ton of carbon emissions per capita. The highest life expectancy levels 
are attained at a wide range of carbon emissions and incomes.   
 
Fig. 3: National development trajectories. Territorial- and consumption-based carbon 
development trajectories from 1990 to 2005 for life expectancy (a) and income (b), contrasted 
with the global fit curves for consumption-based carbon. The trajectories, moving upwards 
except when the arrows indicate otherwise, demonstrate the diversity in possible development 
pathways, and do not follow the global fit curves (shown for consumption-based carbon 
regressions in 1990 and 2005). South Africa’s trajectory in (b) is clockwise. 
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